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Abstract
The compound secure groupcast problem is considered, where the key variables atK receivers
are designed so that a transmitter can securely groupcast a message to any N out of the K
receivers through a noiseless broadcast channel. The metric is the information theoretic tradeoff
between key storage α, i.e., the number of bits of the key variable per message bit, and broadcast
bandwidth β, i.e., the number of bits of the broadcast information per message bit.
We have three main results. First, when broadcast bandwidth is minimized, i.e., when β = 1,
we show that the minimum key storage is α = N . Second, when key storage is minimized, i.e.,
when α = 1, we show that broadcast bandwidth β = min(N,K − N + 1) is achievable and
is optimal (minimum) if N = 2 or K − 1. Third, when N = 2, the optimal key storage and
broadcast bandwidth tradeoff is characterized as α+ β ≥ 3, α ≥ 1, β ≥ 1.
Hua Sun (email: hua.sun@unt.edu) is with the Department of Electrical Engineering at the University of North
Texas.
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1 Introduction
Secure groupcast [1] seeks the most efficient solution to communicate with a group of receivers
over a noiseless broadcast channel securely such that the remaining receivers do not learn anything
about the desired communication. The primary enabler for secure groupcast is that each receiver is
equipped with a correlated key and the transmitter needs to exploit the keys available at the qual-
ified receivers for group communication. At the same time, the keys available to the eavesdropping
receivers are the fundamental challenge as each of the eavesdropping receivers also has a correlated
key and we need to prevent leakage under such multiple intertwined views.
In the basic model of secure groupcast [1], the key variables are fixed and given, e.g., the joint
distribution and the sizes are not subject to design, and the identities of the external eavesdropping
receivers are known globally. In this work, we relax the above two assumptions and consider the
compound secure groupcast problem, where we may design the key variables Zk of the K receivers
(i.e., how to assign the keys is our choice) such that we can communicate a message W with any
N (1 ≤ N ≤ K − 1) out of the K receivers in a secure manner by broadcasting X (i.e., we do
not know which receivers are qualified or eavesdropping beforehand), where the remaining K −N
receivers are ignorant of the desired message. An example of N = 2,K = 3 is shown in Fig. 1.
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Figure 1: Compound secure groupcast to any N = 2 of K = 3 receivers. s1, s2 are 2 uniform i.i.d. symbols
from any finite field. Keys are assigned as Z1 = s1, Z2 = s2, Z3 = s1 + s2. The secure groupcast schemes are
shown when 1) the first 2 receivers, 2) Receiver 1 and Receiver 3, and 3) the last 2 receivers are qualified.
Note that the key assignment remains the same for all 3 scenarios.
The compound secure groupcast problem models an interesting and challenging scenario where
the eavesdropping receivers are internal and their identities are not known in the key set-up stage.
The applications can range from pay TV where the keys are distributed by a central controller and
the message represents a particular channel subscribed by prime users, to a secure broadcasting
system of an organization where the internal users may be compromised and are classified as
unqualified users when sensitive information is later encrypted and heard by all users.
To understand the fundamental limits of compound secure groupcast, we are interested in the
following two metrics.
• Key Storage (α) - To communicate 1 bit of desired message W (to any N users), how many
bits of the key Zk need to be stored at each receiver, denoted as α? For example, consider
Fig. 1, where α = 1 as the key size is the same as the message size.
• Broadcast Bandwidth (β) - To communicate 1 bit of desired message W (to any N users),
how many bits of the broadcast information X need to be sent, denoted as β? For example,
consider Fig. 1, where β = 2 as 2 bits are broadcast to groupcast 1 bit of desired message.
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There exists an interesting tradeoff between key storage α and broadcast bandwidth β, i.e., if
we are allowed to store more key symbols (when α is large), then we may send less information in
the broadcast stage (β can be small), and vice-versa, i.e., if the broadcast resource is abundant,
then we may need to store fewer key symbols. The main motivation of this work is to understand
such (α, β) tradeoff in the information theoretic sense.
Next, we summarize the main results obtained. We mainly focus on the extreme points where
key storage is minimized, i.e., α = 1 and where broadcast bandwidth is minimized, i.e., β = 1, and
wish to characterize the minimum resource required for the other parameter. For both extreme
points, there are natural feasible solutions.
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Figure 2: The s variables are independent. The key assignment is shown and transmitter knows all keys.
1) N = 2,K = 4. β = 1 is minimized and a scheme of α = 3 is shown. 2) N = 3,K = 4. α = 1 is minimized
and a scheme of β = 3 is shown. One possible set of qualified receivers is plotted and other cases are similar.
• When β = 1, we share an independent key for any size N subset of receivers so that for any
set of qualified receivers, we use their exclusive shared key to send the desired message. The
key storage achieved is α =
(
K−1
N−1
)
. See Fig. 2.1 for an example when N = 2,K = 4.
• When α = 1, we set the keys to be independent, i.e., Zk = sk, ∀k ∈ {1, · · · ,K} and sk are
uniform i.i.d. symbols. When any set of N receivers are qualified, we simply send W + sq for
every qualified Receiver q. The broadcast bandwidth achieved is β = N . See Fig. 2.2 for an
example when N = 3,K = 4.
Interestingly, we show that both schemes above are not optimal.
• When β = 1, we can achieve α = N with a generic vector linear scheme. Further, α = N is
the optimal information theoretic key storage, i.e., the minimum achievable by any linear or
non-linear schemes. For example, for the N = 2,K = 4 setting in Fig. 2.1, α can be 2 < 3
and the scheme is presented in Example 1. The general result is presented in Theorem 2.
• When α = 1, we can achieve β = min(N,K − N + 1) with a generic scalar linear scheme.
Further, β = min(N,K −N + 1) is the optimal broadcast bandwidth when N = 2 or K − 1.
For example, for the N = 3,K = 4 setting in Fig. 2.2, β can be 2 < 3 and the scheme is
presented in Example 2. The general result is presented in Theorem 3.
Finally, the insights obtained from above results allow us to characterize the optimal (α, β)
tradeoff when N = 2 and K is arbitrary, as α+ β ≥ 3, α ≥ 1, β ≥ 1. Refer to Theorem 5.
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Notation: For positive integers K1,K2,K1 ≤ K2, we use the notation [K1 : K2] = {K1,K1 +
1, · · · ,K2}. The notation |Q| is used to denote the cardinality of a set Q. The notation A\B
denotes the difference of sets A,B, i.e., the set of elements that are in A but not in B. In this
work, a vector v denotes a row vector by default and vT represents the transpose of v, i.e., vT
is a column vector. For a matrix V, the notation V(i, :) is used to denote the i-th row of V and
the notation V(Q, :) is used to denote the sub-matrix of V formed by retaining only the rows with
indices in the vector formed by arranging elements of the set of numbers Q in an increasing order.
2 Problem Statement
The compound secure groupcast problem has two stages - the key assignment stage and the secure
groupcast stage, specified as follows.
In the key assignment stage, we design K key variables Z1, · · · , ZK , each of which consists of
LZ symbols from a finite field
1 Fp for a prime power p. Zk, k ∈ [1 : K] is given to Receiver k.
In the secure groupcast stage, a transmitter must be able to send a message W securely to any
N ∈ [1 : K − 1] receivers. The message W consists of LW uniform i.i.d. symbols from Fp and is
independent of the key variables (because e.g., W is available after the keys are assigned).
H(W ) = LW (in p-ary units), (1)
I(W ;Z1, · · · , ZK) = 0. (2)
The entropy function is measured in p-ary units throughout this paper.
When the message W is securely groupcast to receivers in the set Q ⊂ [1 : K], |Q| = N , the
transmitter broadcasts signal XQ, where XQ consists of LX symbols2 from Fp and is heard perfectly
by every Receiver k. For any Receiver q that belongs to the qualified set Q, the message must be
recovered with no error3,
[Correctness] H(W |XQ, Zq) = 0, ∀q ∈ Q. (3)
For any Receiver e that does not belong to the qualified set Q, i.e., e ∈ [1 : K]\Q, no information
about the message shall be revealed.
[Security] I(W ;XQ, Ze) = 0,∀e ∈ [1 : K]\Q. (4)
We use the normalized key size (referred to as key storage and denoted by α) and the normalized
broadcast information size (referred to as broadcast bandwidth and denoted by β) to measure the
performance, defined as follows.
α , LZ
LW
, β , LX
LW
. (5)
1To simplify the presentation of the coding scheme, we allow a free choice of the field size p. This is consistent
with an information theoretic formulation, where the actual size of the message is allowed to approach infinity and
performance metrics are defined as ratios such that the effect of the field size is normalized (refer to (5)).
2We assume the scheme is symmetric, i.e., the size of the broadcast information XQ does not depend on Q, which
has no loss of generality as any asymmetric scheme can be transformed to a symmetric one (through space sharing
over permutations of the asymmetric scheme). Equivalently, we measure the broadcast information size using the
worst case. The situation with the key size is similar, i.e., we assume the length of Zk does not depend on k.
3As the achievable schemes in this work all have zero error and zero leakage, for simplicity we do not adopt the
vanishing error and leakage framework, under which our converse results do hold.
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A key storage and broadcast information tuple (α, β) is said to be achievable if there exists a
compound secure groupcast scheme (i.e., a design of the key variables Zk and the broadcast signal
variables XQ) such that the correctness constraint (3) and the security constraint (4) are satisfied
for any Q ⊂ [1 : K], |Q| = N , and key storage and broadcast bandwidth are smaller than or equal
to α and β, respectively. The closure of the set of achievable (α, β) tuples is called the capacity
region C.
3 Results
In this section, we present our results along with illustrative examples and observations.
Let us start with a useful known converse result4, borrowed from [1].
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 in [1]) For the compound secure groupcast problem (to
any N ∈ [1 : K − 1] of K receivers), we have
LW ≤ H(Zq|Ze), ∀q, e ∈ [1 : K], q 6= e, (6)
LX ≥ |Q|LW −
 |Q|∑
i=1
H(Zqi)−H(Zq1 , · · · , Zq|Q|)
 ,
∀Q = {q1, · · · , q|Q|} ⊂ [1 : K], |Q| ≤ N. (7)
The extreme values of the key storage parameter α and the broadcast bandwidth parameter β
follow immediately from Theorem 1.
(6)⇒ LW ≤ H(Zq) ≤ LZ ⇒ α = LZ/LW ≥ 1 (8)
(7)
|Q|=1
=⇒ LX ≥ LW ⇒ β = LX/LW ≥ 1. (9)
That is, the minimum key storage is α = 1 and the minimum broadcast bandwidth is β = 1. Next
we proceed to our results on the corresponding extreme points of the (α, β) region.
3.1 The Minimum Broadcast Bandwidth Extreme Point
The optimal (minimum) key storage α for the minimum broadcast bandwidth extreme point (β = 1)
is characterized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 [Minimum α for Minimum β] For the compound secure groupcast problem (to any
N ∈ [1 : K − 1] of K receivers), when broadcast bandwidth is minimized, β = 1, the minimum key
storage is α = N .
min{α | (α, β = 1) ∈ C} = N. (10)
The proof of Theorem 2 is presented in Section 5.2 and we give an overview here.
For the converse, it suffices to consider only N+1 ≤ K receivers, say receivers 1 to N+1. Focus
on any receiver, say Receiver N + 1, who may be a part of N different sets of qualified receivers,
4The setting studied in [1] is secure groupcast, whose definitions are slightly different from the compound setting,
e.g., broadcast bandwidth is defined as the scaling with respect to the key block length in secure groupcast, so we
give a self-contained proof of Theorem 1 in Section 5.1 for completeness.
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i.e., Q1 = [1 : N + 1]\{1}, · · · ,QN = [1 : N + 1]\{N}. To securely groupcast the message to these
N sets of receivers, the transmit signals are XQ1 , · · · , XQN . When β = 1, i.e., the transmit signal
size is the same the message size, the essence is to realize that we can only use one-time pad and
each of the transmit signal shall contain an independent key (formalized in Lemma 1). After this
claim is established in the information theoretic sense (more precisely, conditioned on the message
W , the mutual information between XQ1 , · · · , XQN and ZN+1 is no less than N times the message
size), we obtain that α ≥ N .
For the achievability, the key of each receiver consists of N generic linear combinations of N +1
uniform i.i.d. basis key symbols, i.e., we operate over an N + 1 dimensional key space and each
receiver is assigned an N dimensional subspace. As such, every N receivers have an overlap of
N ×N − (N − 1)(N + 1) = 1 dimension in generic position, which serves as the exclusive key when
these N receivers are qualified. As this overlap is determined only by the N qualified receivers, this
key (and the one-time pad transmit signal) is independent of the key known by any eavesdropping
receiver (an N dimensional generic subspace) such that the scheme is secure. Interestingly, elegant
and efficient constructions over small field sizes exist for such generic spaces and an example is
given below to illustrate the main idea.
Example 1 Continuing from Fig. 2.1, we consider the compound secure groupcast problem when
N = 2,K = 4 and give a scheme that achieves α = 2, β = 1. Following the intuitions presented
above, we will assign a generic 2 dimensional subspace over a 3 dimensional space to each receiver
when we set the keys. That is, define s1, s2, s3 as 3 uniform i.i.d. symbols from Fp (the value of p
will be specified later) and the key assignments are
Z1 = V1[s1, s2, s3]
T , Z2 = V2[s1, s2, s3]
T , Z3 = V3[s1, s2, s3]
T , Z4 = V4[s1, s2, s3]
T (11)
where each of Vk, k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is a 2 × 3 matrix over Fp such that for any distinct elements
q1, q2, e1, e2 from {1, 2, 3, 4},
dim(rowspan(Vq1) ∩ rowspan(Vq2)) = 1, (12)
rowspan(Vq1) ∩ rowspan(Vq2) is independent of rowspan(Ve1), (13)
rowspan(Vq1) ∩ rowspan(Vq2) is independent of rowspan(Ve2). (14)
The above constraints are easily satisfied by random matrices, e.g., when every element of Vk is
drawn independently and uniformly from Fp for a sufficiently large p (proved by Schwartz-Zippel
lemma [2–4]). However, an elegant solution exists due to Blom [5] and is presented below (using
a slightly different yet equivalent description that aligns with our intuition of generic spaces). Set
p = 5 and consider 4 distinct elements v1, v2, v3, v4 from Fp, e.g., we may set v1 = 1, v2 = 2, v3 =
3, v4 = 4.
V1 =
[
1 v1 0
0 1 v1
]
,V2 =
[
1 v2 0
0 1 v2
]
,V3 =
[
1 v3 0
0 1 v3
]
,V4 =
[
1 v4 0
0 1 v4
]
. (15)
The generic overlaps are as follows. For example, consider rowspan(V1)∩rowspan(V2). The vector
v{1,2} = [1 v1 + v2 v1v2] (16)
is a linear combination of the rows of both V1 and V2, e.g., the first row plus v2 times the second
row for V1. Other choices of two Vk matrices are similar. Now when Receiver 1 and Receiver 2
are qualified, the transmit signal is
X{1,2} = W + v{1,2}[s1, s2, s3]T . (17)
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Correctness holds as v{1,2} can be obtained locally at both Receiver 1 and Receiver 2. To guarantee
security, we need that v{1,2} is independent of V3 and V4, respectively. For example, consider V3.
V{1,2}∪{3} =
[
V3
v12
]
=
 1 v3 00 1 v3
1 v1 + v2 v1v2
⇒ det(V{1,2}∪{3}) = (v3 − v1)(v3 − v2) 6= 0 (18)
as vk are distinct.
I(W ;X{1,2}, Z3) = H(X{1,2}, Z3)−H(X{1,2}, Z3|W ) (19)
(2)
= H(X{1,2}, Z3)−H(V{1,2}∪{3}[s1, s2, s3]T ) (20)
≤ 3− 3 = 0 (21)
where in the last step, the first term follows from the fact that X{1,2}, Z3 consists of only 3 symbols
from Fp and uniform distributions maximize entropy, and the second term follows from (18) stating
that V{1,2}∪{3} has full rank. Hence, the security constraint (4) is satisfied. Finally, the achieved
performance is as desired because α = 2 = N (2 key symbols are stored for a 1 symbol message),
and β = 1 (1 symbol is broadcast to groupcast a 1 symbol message).
Interestingly, the generic space assignment when N = 2 introduced by Blom is generalized to
arbitrary N by Matsumoto and Imai [6], in the context of key predistribution. The details can
be found in Section 5.2 and the connection of compound secure groupcast to prior work in key
predistribution (and other problems) is discussed in Section 4.
3.2 The Minimum Key Storage Extreme Point
A scalar linear achievable scheme for the minimum key storage extreme point (α = 1) is presented
in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 [Achievable β for Minimum α] For the compound secure groupcast problem (to any
N ∈ [1 : K − 1] of K receivers), when key storage is minimized, α = 1, broadcast bandwidth
β = min(N,K −N + 1) is achievable for any N,K and is optimal when N = 2 or K − 1.
min{β | (α = 1, β) ∈ C} ≤ min(N,K −N + 1). (22)
min{β | (α = 1, β) ∈ C} = 2, when N = 2,K − 1(K ≥ 3). (23)
The converse proof (when min(N,K −N + 1) = 2) follows from Theorem 5 (refer to the proof
of Theorem 5 presented later in Section 3.3). Note that N ≥ 2 and K ≥ 3.
(33)⇒ α+ β ≥ 3 α=1=⇒ β ≥ 2. (24)
The achievability proof of Theorem 3 is presented in Section 5.3. A proof outline is as follows.
The case where min(N,K −N + 1) = N is trivial as the independent key solution will work (refer
to Fig. 2.2). We only need to consider the case where min(N,K−N+1) = K−N+1. Here the key
of each receiver is 1 generic linear combination of K −N + 1 uniform i.i.d. basis key symbols, i.e.,
we operate over a K −N + 1 dimensional key space and each receiver is assigned a 1 dimensional
subspace. The transmit signal X for any N qualified receivers is a length K −N + 1 vector, where
each element is a sum of the message W scaled by a constant and a basis key symbol. To ensure
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that the K −N eavesdropping receivers learn nothing about the message, we precode the message
to the direction that is orthogonal to the key space of each eavesdropping receiver (by choosing
the K −N + 1 constants before W in X). This precoding vector can be chosen as the null space
of the K − N dimensional subspace seen by all the eavesdropping receivers, which exists and has
1 dimension over a K − N + 1 dimensional space. Further, the subspaces are generic so that the
projection of the precoded message to the 1 dimensional subspace held by any qualified receiver is
not empty, and correctness follows. It turns out that MDS matrices suffice for the above coding
scheme. An example is given below to illustrate this idea.
Example 2 Continuing from Fig. 2.2, we consider the compound secure groupcast problem when
N = 3,K = 4 and give a scheme that achieves α = 1, β = 2. The generic key assignment is as
follows. Define s1, s2 as 2 uniform i.i.d. symbols from F3.
Z1 = s1, Z2 = s2, Z3 = s1 + s2, Z4 = s1 + 2s2. (25)
Suppose receivers 1 to 3 are qualified. The transmit signal is set as
X{1,2,3} =
[ −2
1
]
W +
[
s1
s2
]
(26)
where for W , the precoding vector [−2, 1]T is orthogonal to the key space of the eavesdropping
Receiver 4, [1, 2], so that security is guaranteed. For correct decoding, take Receiver 3 as an
example, who will project the transmit signal to his key space.
(−2W + s1) + (W + s2) = −W + s1 + s2 = −W + Z3 (27)
so that the knowledge of Z3 ensures that W can be decoded with no error. The transmit signals for
other cases are designed similarly.
X{1,2,4} =
[ −1
1
]
W +
[
s1
s2
]
, X{1,3,4} =
[
1
0
]
W +
[
s1
s2
]
, X{2,3,4} =
[
0
1
]
W +
[
s1
s2
]
. (28)
Finally, key storage α = 1 and broadcast bandwidth β = 2 = K −N + 1 are achieved, as desired.
We next improve the result in Theorem 3 for the simplest setting where the optimal broadcast
bandwidth for the minimum key storage extreme point (α = 1) is open. For this setting (N =
3,K = 5), we have the following upper and lower bounds.
Theorem 4 [N = 3,K = 5] For the compound secure groupcast problem (to any 3 of 5 receivers),
when key storage is minimized, α = 1, the minimum broadcast bandwidth satisfies 2.5 ≤ β ≤ 2.9.
2.5 ≤ min{β | (α = 1, β) ∈ C} ≤ 2.9, when N = 3,K = 5. (29)
The converse proof of Theorem 4 is deferred to Section 5.4, where we translate the lower bound
on broadcast bandwidth to a lower bound on joint key size for 3 receivers, H(Z1, Z2, Z3) ≥ 2.5LW .
The achievable scheme is presented now, where we improve the achievability of β = 3 in Theorem
3 to that of β = 2.9 by introducing some correlation into the generic spaces used in Theorem 3.
We first present a scalar linear scheme that achieves average broadcast bandwidth 2.9. The
keys are assigned as
Z1 = s1, Z2 = s2, Z3 = s3, Z4 = s4, Z5 = s1 + s2 (30)
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where s1, s2, s3, s4 are 4 uniform i.i.d. symbols from F3. There are
(
K
N
)
=
(
5
3
)
= 10 distinct choices
of the qualified receivers, out of which 1 can be achieved with 2 symbols of broadcast signal and the
remaining cases require 3 symbols of broadcast signal, to groupcast LW = 1 message symbol. The
design principle is the same as that of the achievability proof of Theorem 3. Specifically, ∀i ∈ {3, 4},
∀j ∈ {1, 2, 5},
X{1,2,i} =
 W + s1−W + s2
W + si
 , X{1,2,5} = [ W + s1W + s2
]
, X{j,3,4} =
 W + ZjW + s3
W + s4
 , (31)
X{1,i,5} =
 W + s1s2
W + si
 , X{2,i,5} =
 s1W + s2
W + si
 (32)
where correctness and security are easy to verify. Next, we symmetrize the above scheme by
applying it to any all permutations of the 5 receivers and concatenation, i.e., the size of each of
W,Zk, XQ is scaled by 5! and now broadcast bandwidth becomes symmetric and β = 0.9 × 3 +
0.1× 2 = 2.9. The achievability proof is complete now.
3.3 Key Storage and Broadcast Bandwidth Region
In this section, we present our results on the capacity region (α, β).
When N = 1, the capacity region is characterized as C = {(α, β) : α ≥ 1, β ≥ 1} and is plotted
in Fig. 3.1. Here we only have one extreme point, where the minimum key storage and the minimum
broadcast bandwidth are simultaneously attained. The proof is immediate, e.g., converse is proved
in (8), (9) and achievability may follow from either Theorem 2 or Theorem 3.
0 1
1
¸
˛
0 1
1
¸
˛
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Figure 3: The key storage and broadcast bandwidth region (α, β) of compound secure groupcast - 1) when
N = 1 and K ≥ 2 is arbitrary, and 2) when N = 2 and K ≥ 3 is arbitrary.
Next we consider the case where N = 2. It turns out that the capacity region is characterized
fully by the two extreme points considered in previous sections (see Fig. 3.2). This result is stated
in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 [(α, β) Region when N = 2] For the compound secure groupcast problem (to any N = 2
of K receivers), the capacity region has and only has two extreme points - one corresponding to
minimum key storage, (α, β) = (1, 2) and the other corresponding to minimum broadcast bandwidth,
(α, β) = (2, 1).
C = {(α, β) : α+ β ≥ 3, α ≥ 1, β ≥ 1}, when N = 2 and K ≥ 3 is arbitrary. (33)
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Proof: Achievability of the two extreme points follows from Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, respec-
tively. For the converse, we only need to prove α+β ≥ 3 as α ≥ 1 has been proved in (8) and β ≥ 1
has been proved in (9). The proof of α+ β ≥ 3 is presented next, which is a simple consequence of
the bounds in Theorem 1. Consider (6) and set q = 1, e = 2.
LW ≤ H(Z1|Z2). (34)
Consider (7) and set Q = {1, 2}.
LX ≥ 2LW − (H(Z1) +H(Z2)−H(Z1, Z2)) (35)
= 2LW −H(Z1) +H(Z1|Z2) (36)
(34)
≥ 2LW − LZ + LW (37)
⇒ α+ β = (LZ + LX)/LW ≥ 3. (38)
4 Related Work
In this section, we discuss connections of compound secure groupcast to prior work in cryptogra-
phy, mainly two lines - key predistribution and broadcast encryption. For related work on secure
groupcast, we refer to [1].
The key (pre)-distribution problem refers to the assignment of a number of key variables (each
belongs to a user) such that certain subsets (e.g., any N of K keys) can agree on an independent
key that is known exclusively to the given subset of users. Key predistribution systems naturally
provide an achievable scheme for compound secure groupcast, where the qualified receivers (users)
can extract an exclusive secure key according to a key predistribution scheme and use this key
to securely groupcast the message with one-time pad. Key predistribution based schemes turn
out to be optimal for the key storage α and broadcast bandwidth β tradeoff for compound secure
groupcast, when broadcast bandwidth is minimized (refer to Theorem 2), and are sub-optimal in
general, e.g., when key storage is minimized (refer to Theorem 3). Specifically, in establishing
Theorem 2, we invoke elegant key predistribution schemes from early works in the field [5, 6].
Key predistribution has been extensively studied in cryptography since [5, 6], subject to both
information theoretic security and computational security constriants. In particular, under infor-
mation theoretic security, [7] showed that for any N out of K users to agree on an independent
key (i.e., the symmetric setting), the minimum storage per user is equal to N times the key size.
This result coincides with the minimum key storage result (α = N) for the minimum broadcast
bandwidth extreme point (β = 1) for compound secure groupcast. While key predistribution was
originally studied in the symmetric any N out of K setting and in the non-interactive setting, in-
teresting generalizations to allow asymmetric access structure and to allow communication among
the users, so that storage size is reduced, have appeared in [8] and [9], respectively. For other key
predistribution works under information theoretic security, we refer to survey papers [10, 11] and
references therein. Computational security works can be found in cryptography textbooks [12,13].
Another line of related work is referred to as broadcast encryption [14], where the goal is to
enable secure broadcasting to selected sets of receivers with the major focus on key management
under dynamic changes of qualified users. Since its introduction [14], broadcast encryption has
grown to a big umbrella that covers a wide array of themes, e.g., computational security (see
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e.g., [15, 16]), key management with multicast trees (see e.g., [17–19]), and user revocation (see
e.g., [20, 21]).
The topic within broadcast encryption that is most related to our work is (information theo-
retically secure) one-time broadcast encryption schemes [10, 22], which is essentially the same as
compound secure groupcast albeit it is not formulated in Shannon theoretic framework (with some
minor difference). Entropy based approaches have been employed in [22, 23], where the main fo-
cus is on the code construction and analyzing the storage requirement for key predistribution and
one-time pad coding based schemes (which is efficient only near the β = 1 extreme point). The
tradeoff between key storage and broadcast bandwidth has also been noted [10, 24], where various
tools from coding theory, design theory, and secret sharing have been used to construct several
classes of achievable schemes while the information theoretic optimality of the proposed schemes is
largely unknown due to the lack of converse (notably one converse bound appeared in Theorem 3
of [24] and it is equivalent to α+ β ≥ 3 in our notation (proof omitted though [24])). In contrast,
in this work we focus on establishing the optimality of extreme points and the capacity region of
elemental systems, e.g., N = 2. The schemes in [10, 24] could be useful for future studies on the
overall (α, β) tradeoff of larger compound secure groupcast systems (and generalizations to arbi-
trary access structure that goes beyond the symmetric any N of K setting and to include colluding
eavesdropping receivers).
5 Proofs
5.1 Proof of Theorem 1
First, consider (6). For any q, e ∈ [1 : K], q 6= e, suppose Receiver q is qualified and Receiver e is
not (i.e., eavesdropping), which is possible for any q, e in the compound secure groupcast problem.
Consider any qualified set of receivers, Q such that q ∈ Q, e /∈ Q, |Q| = N .
LW = H(W )
(2)
= H(W |Ze) (39)
(3)
= I(W ;XQ, Zq|Ze) (40)
(4)
= I(W ;Zq|Ze, XQ) ≤ H(Zq|Ze). (41)
Second, consider (7). Without loss of generality, we set Q = {1, · · · , Q}, Q ≤ N and suppose
receivers 1 to N are qualified.
LX ≥ H(X[1:N ]) ≥ I(X[1:N ];W,Z1, · · · , ZQ) (42)
= I(X[1:N ];W,Z1) +
Q−1∑
q=1
I(X[1:N ];Zq+1|W,Z1, · · · , Zq) (43)
(2)
≥ I(X[1:N ];W |Z1) +
Q−1∑
q=1
I(X[1:N ],W ;Zq+1|Z1, · · · , Zq) (44)
(2)
= I(X[1:N ], Z1;W ) +
Q−1∑
q=1
(
I(X[1:N ],W,Z1, · · · , Zq;Zq+1)
− I(Z1, · · · , Zq;Zq+1)
)
(45)
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(3)
≥ H(W ) +
Q−1∑
q=1
(
I(W ;Zq+1|X[1:N ])− I(Z1, · · · , Zq;Zq+1)
)
(46)
(3)
= H(W ) +
Q−1∑
q=1
(
H(W |X[1:N ])− I(Z1, · · · , Zq;Zq+1)
)
(47)
(4)
= H(W ) +
Q−1∑
q=1
(
H(W )− I(Z1, · · · , Zq;Zq+1)
)
(48)
= QLW −
( Q∑
q=1
H(Zq)−H(Z1, · · · , ZQ)
)
. (49)
5.2 Proof of Theorem 2: αmin = N when β = 1
We present the achievability proof and the converse proof in the following two sections.
5.2.1 Achievability
We show that α = N, β = 1 is achievable. The coding scheme is as follows.
Denote by s1, · · · , sN+1 a basis set of independent uniform symbols from Fp, where p is any
prime power that is greater than or equal to K. Define s = [s1, · · · , sN+1] ∈ F1×(N+1)p . The keys
are assigned according to
Zk = Vks
T , ∀k ∈ [1 : K] (50)
where Vk =

1 vk 0 · · · 0
0 1 vk · · · 0
... · · · ... · · · 0
0 0 · · · 1 vk

N×(N+1)
(51)
and v1, · · · , vK are distinct elements from Fp. (52)
Note that the above elegant construction was introduced by Matsumoto and Imai [6].
For any set of N qualified receivers, Q = {q1, · · · , qN} ⊂ [1 : K], the transmit signal is
XQ = W + zQ = W + vQsT (53)
where vQ = [1
∑
i
vqi
∑
i,j,i6=j
vqivqj · · ·
∏
i
vqi ]1×(N+1). (54)
Note that the n-th element of vQ, n ∈ [1 : N + 1] has degree n − 1 and is the sum of the product
of all distinct n− 1 terms from vq1 , · · · , vqN . Note also that W ∈ Fp, XQ ∈ Fp.
We verify correctness. To this end, we show that every qualified receiver can recover vQsT such
that W can be decoded with no error. For any q ∈ Q,
vQ = Vq(1, :) +Vq(2, :)
∑
i 6=q
vqi +Vq(3, :)
∑
i,j,i6=j,i6=q,j 6=q
vqivqj + · · ·+Vq(N, :)
∏
i 6=q
vqi . (55)
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Hence, vQ is a linear combination of the rows of Vq and correctness holds. We consider security
next. Consider any eavesdropping Receiver e ∈ [1 : K]\Q.
VQ∪{e} =
[
Ve
vQ
]
=

1 ve 0 · · · 0
0 1 ve · · · 0
... · · · ... · · · 0
0 0 · · · 1 ve
1
∑
i vqi
∑
i,j,i6=j vqivqj · · ·
∏
i vqi

(N+1)×(N+1)
(56)
⇒ det(VQ∪{e}) = (−1)N
∏
i
(ve − vqi) 6= 0 as vk are distinct. (57)
Note that we have omitted the detailed steps of the derivation of the determinant formula (57),
which is straightforward to verify. We show that the security constraint (4) is satisfied.
I(W ;XQ, Ze) = H(XQ, Ze)−H(XQ, Ze|W ) (58)
(2)(56)
≤ (N + 1)−H(VQ∪{e}sT ) (57)= 0. (59)
Finally, each key Zk has N symbols and each broadcast signal XQ has 1 symbol, so we have achieved
α = N, β = 1. The achievability proof of Theorem 2 is thus complete.
5.2.2 Converse
We prove that when β = 1, the inequality α ≥ N holds.
Let us start with a useful lemma.
Lemma 1 When β = 1, for any Q ⊂ [1 : K], |Q| = N , we have
H(XQ) = H(XQ|W ) = LX = LW , (60)
H(XQ|W,Zq) = 0, ∀q ∈ Q, (61)
I(XQ;Ze) = I(XQ;Ze|W ) = 0, ∀e /∈ Q. (62)
Remark 1 The interpretation of Lemma 1 is that when β = 1, every qualified set must agree on
a key, and we essentially have to use one-time pad coding with such a key (see (60)(61)). Further,
the key of any qualified set must be secure to any eavesdropping receiver (see (62)).
Proof: First consider (60) and (61). Consider any q ∈ Q. Note that β = LX/LW = 1.
LX = LW = H(W )
(2)
= H(W |Zq) (63)
(3)
= I(W ;XQ|Zq) (64)
≤ H(XQ)−H(XQ|W,Zq) (65)
≤ H(XQ) ≤ LX (66)
⇒ H(XQ) = LX = LW (67)
H(XQ|W,Zq) = 0 (68)
⇒ H(XQ|W ) (4)= H(XQ) = LX = LW . (69)
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Then consider (62). Consider any e /∈ Q and any q ∈ Q. Note that β = LX/LW = 1.
H(XQ|Ze) ≥ H(XQ|Ze, Zq) (70)
= I(XQ;W |Ze, Zq) +H(XQ|W,Ze, Zq) (71)
(3)(61)
= H(W |Ze, Zq) (72)
(2)
= H(W ) (73)
(1)
= LW (74)
= LX (75)
≥ H(XQ) (76)
⇒ I(XQ;Ze) = 0 as mutual information is non-negative (77)
I(XQ;Ze|W ) (4)= I(XQ;Ze,W ) (78)
(77)
= I(XQ;W |Ze) (79)
(4)
= 0. (80)
Next, we consider only the first N + 1 receivers. Note that K ≥ N + 1 and removing users
cannot enlarge the capacity region. Consider all qualified sets that include Receiver N + 1 and
there are N such qualified sets, i.e., Q1 = [1 : N + 1]\{1}, · · · ,QN = [1 : N + 1]\{N}.
LZ ≥ H(ZN+1) (2)= H(ZN+1|W ) (81)
≥ I(ZN+1;XQ1 , XQ2 , · · · , XQN |W ) (82)
=
N∑
i=1
I(ZN+1;XQi |W,XQ1 , · · · , XQi−1) (83)
(61)
=
N∑
i=1
H(XQi |W,XQ1 , · · · , XQi−1) (84)
=
N∑
i=1
(
H(XQi |W )− I(XQi ;XQ1 , · · · , XQi−1 |W )
)
(85)
≥
N∑
i=1
(
H(XQi |W )− I(XQi ;Zi, XQ1 , · · · , XQi−1 |W )
)
(86)
(61)
=
N∑
i=1
H(XQi |W )−
N∑
i=1
I(XQi ;Zi|W ) (87)
(60)(62)
= NLW − 0 (88)
⇒ α = LZ/LW ≥ N (89)
where (84) follows from the observation that N + 1 ∈ Qi. In (87), we use the fact that i ∈
Q1, · · · ,Qi−1, i ≥ 2, and in (88), we use the fact that i /∈ Qi. The converse proof of Theorem 2 is
now complete.
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5.3 Achievability Proof of Theorem 3: β ≤ min(N,K −N + 1) when α = 1
We present a coding scheme that achieves α = 1, β = min(N,K − N + 1). We have two cases,
depending on min(N,K −N + 1) is equal to N or K −N + 1.
First, consider the case where min(N,K−N+1) = K−N+1, and we show that β = K−N+1
is achievable. Define s = [s1, · · · , sK−N+1] ∈ F1×(K−N+1)p , where s1, · · · , sK−N+1 are K − N + 1
uniform i.i.d. symbols from Fp and p is a prime power that is greater than or equal to K. The keys
are assigned as
Zk = V(k, :)s
T (90)
where V(k, :) ∈ F1×(K+N−1)p is the k-th row of the matrix V, and
V is a K × (K −N + 1) MDS matrix. (91)
For our scheme, the only requirement on the field size p is that an MDS matrix V exists over Fp.
So p ≥ K suffices as we may set V as the Vandermonde matrix. For any N receivers from the
qualified set Q ⊂ [1 : K], |Q| = N , the transmit signal is set as
XQ = vTWW + s
T (92)
where W ∈ Fp is LW = 1 symbol, XQ ∈ F(K−N+1)×1p is a column vector and vTW ∈ F(K−N+1)×1p is
chosen such that
V([1 : K]\Q, :)× vTW = ~0(K−N)×1, (93)
i.e., vTW may be set as the right null space of the (K −N)× (K −N + 1) matrix V([1 : K]\Q, :).
Such a column vector vTW exists because V is MDS and V([1 : K]\Q, :) has rank K −N . Further,
V(q, :)× vTW 6= 0,∀q ∈ Q (94)
because otherwise V([1 : K]\Q∪{q}, :)×vTW = 0, which leads to that a (K−N + 1)× (K−N + 1)
sub-matrix of V, V([1 : K]\Q ∪ {q}, :), is rank deficient, violating the fact that V has been set as
an MDS matrix.
To show that zero error decoding is guaranteed, consider any qualified Receiver q ∈ Q, who will
project the received signal XQ to his key space.
V(q, :)×XQ = V(q, :)× vTWW +V(q, :)× sT =
(
V(q, :)× vTW
)
W + Zq (95)
such that from (94), V(q, :) × vTW is a non-zero scalar and W can be recovered. We now verify
security. Consider any eavesdropping Receiver e ∈ [1 : K]\Q.
I(W ;XQ, Ze) = I(W ;vTWW + s
T ,V(e, :)sT ) (96)
(93)
= I(W ;vTWW + s
T ) (97)
= H(vTWW + s
T )−H(vTWW + sT |W ) (98)
(2)
≤ (K +N − 1)−H(sT ) = 0 (99)
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where (97) follows from the fact that V(e, :)sT is a deterministic function of vTWW + s
T , i.e.,
V(e, :)×
(
vTWW + s
T
)
=
(
V(e, :)× vTW
)
W +V(e, :)sT
(93)
= V(e, :)sT . (100)
Hence the security constraint is satisfied. Finally, we have achieved α = 1 as each Zk has 1 symbol
and β = K −N + 1 as each XQ has K +N − 1 symbols.
Second, consider the case where min(N,K −N + 1) = N . While the simple scheme that uses
fully independent keys will work (refer to Fig. 2.1), we present a scheme with smaller joint key size.
Define s = [s1, · · · , sN+1] ∈ F1×(N+1)p , where s1, · · · , sN+1 are N+1 uniform i.i.d. symbols from
Fp and p is a prime power that is greater than or equal to K. The keys are assigned as
Zk = V(k, :)s
T , where V is a K × (N + 1) MDS matrix (101)
and the transmit signal XQ,∀Q ⊂ [1 : K], |Q| = N is set as
XQ = ~1N×1W +V(Q, :)sT (102)
where ~1 is an N × 1 column vector such that every element is 1 and XQ has dimension N × 1.
To see correctness, note that any qualified receiver q ∈ Q can decode W with no error from
W + V(q, :)sT = W + Zq, which is one row of XQ. To see security, note that any eavesdropping
receiver cannot learn anything about W because
I(W ;XQ, Ze) = H(XQ, Ze)−H(XQ, Ze|W ) (103)
(2)
≤ (N + 1)−H(V(Q∪ {e}, :)sT ) = 0 (104)
where the last step follows from the fact that V is an MDS matrix such that any N + 1 rows have
full rank. Finally, we have achieved α = 1 and β = N , as desired.
The achievability proof of Theorem 3 is now complete.
5.4 Converse Proof of Theorem 4: β ≥ 2.5 when α = 1, N = 3, K = 5
Let us start with a useful lemma.
Lemma 2 When α = 1, for any q, e ∈ [1 : K], q 6= e, we have
H(Zq) = LW , (105)
H(Zq, Ze) = 2LW . (106)
Remark 2 The interpretation of Lemma 2 is that when α = 1, the key at any receiver is uniform
and the keys at any two receivers are independent.
Proof: Note that α = LZ/LW = 1. From (6) in Theorem 1, we have
LZ = LW ≤ H(Zq|Ze) ≤ H(Zq) ≤ LZ (107)
⇒ H(Zq) = LW and symmetrically, H(Ze) = LW (108)
H(Zq|Ze) = H(Zq)⇒ I(Zq;Ze) = 0⇒ H(Zq, Ze) = H(Zq) +H(Ze) (108)= 2LW . (109)
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We next show that H(Z1, Z2, Z3) ≥ 2.5LW . To this end, we consider only the first 4 receivers
(which cannot help for the converse) and assume that Receiver 1 and Receiver 3 are qualified while
Receiver 2 and Receiver 4 are eavesdropping. From submodularity of entropy functions, we have
H(Z1, Z2, Z3) +H(Z1, Z3, X{1,3},W ) ≥ H(Z1, Z3) +H(Z1, Z2, Z3, X{1,3},W )(110)
≥ H(Z1, Z3) +H(Z2, X{1,3},W ) (111)
(4)
= H(Z1, Z3) +H(Z2, X{1,3}) +H(W ) (112)
Similarly, H(Z1, Z2, Z4) +H(Z2, Z4, X{1,3}) ≥ H(Z2, Z4) +H(Z1, Z2, Z4, X{1,3}) (113)
(3)
= H(Z2, Z4) +H(Z1, Z2, Z4, X{1,3},W )(114)
≥ H(Z2, Z4) +H(Z4, X{1,3},W ) (115)
(4)
= H(Z2, Z4) +H(Z4, X{1,3}) +H(W ). (116)
Adding (112) and (116), we have
H(Z1, Z2, Z3) +H(Z1, Z3, X{1,3},W ) +H(Z1, Z2, Z4) +H(Z2, Z4, X{1,3})
≥ H(Z1, Z3) +H(Z2, Z4) + 2H(W ) +H(Z2, X{1,3}) +H(Z4, X{1,3}) (117)
≥ H(Z1, Z3) +H(Z2, Z4) + 2H(W ) +H(X{1,3}) +H(Z2, Z4, X{1,3}) (118)
(1)(106)
= 6LW +H(X{1,3}) +H(Z2, Z4, X{1,3}). (119)
Note that by symmetry, we may assume H(Z1, Z2, Z3) = H(Z1, Z2, Z4) without loss of generality.
Plugging this above, we have
H(Z1, Z3, X{1,3},W ) + 2H(Z1, Z2, Z3) ≥ 6LW +H(X{1,3}). (120)
A upper bound of H(Z1, Z3, X{1,3},W ) can be obtained as follows.
2LW + 2H(X{1,3})
(105)
= H(Z1) +H(X{1,3}) +H(Z3) +H(X{1,3}) (121)
≥ H(Z1, X{1,3}) +H(Z3, X{1,3}) (122)
(3)
= H(Z1, X{1,3},W ) +H(Z3, X{1,3},W ) (123)
≥ H(X{1,3},W ) +H(Z1, Z3, X{1,3},W ) (124)
(4)
= H(X{1,3}) +H(W ) +H(Z1, Z3, X{1,3},W ) (125)
(120) + (125)⇒ H(Z1, Z2, Z3) ≥ 2.5LW . (126)
Finally, we invoke (7) in Theorem 1 to translate the joint key size bound above to the desired
broadcast bandwidth bound. Consider the N = 3,K = 5 compound secure groupcast problem and
set Q = {1, 2, 3}. From (7), we have
LX ≥ 3LW −
(
H(Z1) +H(Z2) +H(Z3)−H(Z1, Z2, Z3)
)
(127)
(105)
= H(Z1, Z2, Z3) (128)
(126)
≥ 2.5LW (129)
⇒ β = LX/LW ≥ 2.5. (130)
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5.4.1 Minimum Joint Key Size is 2.5 when (N,K,α, β) = (2, 4, 1, 2)
In this section, we show that for the compound secure groupcast problem to any N = 2 of K =
4 receivers, when (α, β) = (1, 2) (i.e., the minimum key storage extreme point), the minimum
normalized joint key size H(Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4)/LW is 2.5. We present this result because the minimum
joint key size could be a useful auxiliary parameter, e.g., it is used to prove the broadcast bandwidth
converse of Theorem 4. In addition, the minimum joint key size is an interesting parameter by itself
as it captures the minimum randomness resource required for compound secure groupcast.
The converse H(Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4) ≥ H(Z1, Z2, Z3) ≥ 2.5LW follows from (126), proved in the
previous section, and the achievability is presented below. The keys are assigned as
Z1 = (s1, s2), Z2 = (s3, s4), Z3 = (s5, s1 + s3), Z4 = (s2 + s4, s1 + s2 + s5) (131)
where s1, s2, s3, s4, s5 are 5 uniform i.i.d. symbols from any field Fp. The message W has 2 symbols,
W = (W1,W2). The transmit broadcast signals are
X{1,2} =

W1 + s1
W2 + s2
−W1 + s3
−W2 + s4
 , X{1,3} =

W1 + s1
W2 + s2
−W1 −W2 + s5
W1 + s1 + s3
 , X{1,4} =

W1 + s1
W2 + s2
W2 + s2 + s4
W1 +W2 + s1 + s2 + s5

X{2,3} =

W1 + s3
W2 + s4
W2 + s5
W1 + s1 + s3
 , X{2,4} =

W1 + s3
W2 + s4
W2 + s2 + s4
−W1 + s1 + s2 + s5
 , X{3,4} =

W1 + s5
W2 + s1 + s3
−W2 + s2 + s4
W1 + s1 + s2 + s5
(132)
where the first (second) qualified receiver will use the first (last) two rows of X to decode W
and security is guaranteed because the projection of W in X to the key space known by any
eavesdropping receiver is empty. We finally calculate the performance of this scheme. Note that
LW = 2, LZ = 2, LX = 4, H(Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5) = H(s1, s2, s3, s4, s5) = 5, so we have achieved
α = LZ/LW = 1, β = LX/LW = 2, H(Z1, Z2, Z3, Z4, Z5)/LW = 2.5 (133)
and the proof is thus complete.
6 Conclusion
Motivated by the need to enable secure groupcast with demand uncertainty and inspired by related
work in cryptography (especially broadcast encryption), we consider the compound secure groupcast
problem that studies how to assign keys to efficiently and securely communicate with any N of
K receivers through noiseless broadcasting, and focus on the tradeoff between key storage α and
broadcast bandwidth β from an information theoretic perspective.
Complete answers are found when broadcast bandwidth is minimized, i.e., when β = 1, the
minimum key storage is α = N , while the results are not tight when key storage is minimized, e.g.,
when α = 1, broadcast bandwidth β = min(N,K −N + 1) is achievable yet not optimal in general
(i.e., settings with N ≥ 3,K ≥ N +2 are open). Regarding the general α, β tradeoff, i.e., the (α, β)
region, while N = 2 cases are settled fully by the two extreme points where either α = 1 or β = 1,
settings with N ≥ 3 remain open.
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The solutions of this work mainly rely on generic spaces (matrices) and are found with an
alignment (signal space) view of the problem (which also appears useful in several security and
privacy primitives [25–27]). To further improve the achievable schemes, more structured spaces are
in demand and remain an interesting future research direction.
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